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Suppose each of an odd number n of voters has a strict preference order on the three ‘candi- 
dates’ in { 1,2,3} and votes for his most preferred candidate on a plurality ballot. Assume that 
a voter who votes for i is equally likely to have ijk and ikj as his preference order when 
{iLkJ={t,2,3}. 
Fix an integer m between f(n + 1) and n inclusive. Then, given that n, of the n voters vote for 
i, let f,,(nt, nz,ns) be the probability that one of the three candidates is preferred by m or more 
voters to each of the other two. 
This paper examines the behavior off, over the lattice points in L,, the set of triples of non- 
negative integers that sum to n. It identifies the regions in L, where f, is 1 and where f, is 0, 
then shows that &(a,b+l,c)>f,(a+l,b,c) whenever a+b+c+l =n, ascsb, a<b<m and 
c< n - m. These results are used to partially identify the points in L, wheref, is minimized sub- 
ject to f, >O. It is shown that at least two of the n, are equal at minimizing points. 
1. Introduction 
Given n voters, n odd, and candidate set { 1,2,3), the probability that one candi- 
date will be preferred by a majority of voters to each of the others when voters 
independently select preference rankings from S = { 123,132,213,231,312,321} 
according to the uniform distribution on S has been studied extensively [2-41. My 
aim here is to investigate the likelihood of a candidate achieving a specified size of 
majority over the others within the voters’ rankings when the only data revealed 
about their rankings are their first choices. 
It is assumed that each voter independently selects a ranking in S but reveals only 
his first-ranked candidate, as in plurality voting. We shall also assume that a voter’s 
actual ranking is equally likely to be either of the two in S that have the candidate 
he voted for in first place. Let m be an integer in (+(n + l), . . . , n} and, given that 
n; of the n voters vote for i, let &(n,, n2, n3) be the probability that some candidate 
is ranked ahead of each of the others in at least m of the n selected rankings. 
This paper examines the behavior of f, as (n,, nZ,n,) varies over the lattice 
points in 
L, = {(nl,n2,n3): n;~ (0, l,...} and c nj = n}. 
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An earlier paper [l] looked at the special case of simple-majority dominance, where 
m = +(n + l), and reported the following with f =f, when m = +(n + 1): 
f(n,,n2,n3) = 1 iff max(n;} L +(n+l); 
f(nI,n2,n3)>0 for all (nI,n2,n3)~L,; 
f(a,b+l,c)>f(a+l,b,c) if a<b, alclb+l, 
and max{b,c) s+(n-1); 
f takes on its minimum over L, iff lnj - nj ) I 1 
for all i,je {1,2,3}. 
Our results for m > +(n + 1) differ from the simple-majority results in several ways. 
First, when rn> +(n + 3), there will be (n,, n2, ns) in L, at which fm(n,, n2, n3) = 0. 
Second, the inequality f,(a, b + 1, c) > f,(a+ 1, b, c), while generally valid for certain 
combinations (a, 6, c), does not hold to the extent that it does when m = +(n + 1). 
Third, with 
L(m) = {(nt, n2, n3> EL,: fm(9, n2,nd > 01, 
f, is not always minimized at the central points where f is minimized, even when 
these points are in L,(m). However, it will be proved that if (n,, n2, n,) is a point 
in L,(m) that minimizes f,, over the region where it does not vanish, then at least 
two of the ni are equal. 
Precise statements of the results for m 2 +(n + 3) appear in the next section along 
with the shorter proofs and an open conjecture about points that minimize f, over 
L,(m). Supporting proofs are given in the third section. 
2. Theorems and illustrations 
Our first theorem identifies L,(m) by complementation. 
Theorem 1. f,(nl,n2,n3)=l iff max{ni}2m; f,(nl,nz,n3)=0 iff max{n;}+ 
min{n;} Cm. 
Proof. If max{n;> zm, then clearly f, = 1; otherwise, n, rankings 123, n2 rankings 
231, and n3 rankings 312 show that, with positive probability, no candidate is 
preferred to each of the others by at least m voters. 
Since f, is symmetric in its arguments, assume for definiteness in the f, =0 
proof that n, zn2zn3. If any candidate can be preferred by at least m voters to 
each of the others, then candidate 1 will be such a candidate, and this will happen 
ifandonlyifn,+.n2~mandn,+n~~m,i.e.,iffn,+n3=max{nj}+min{nj}~m. 
Hence L,(m)={(n,,n,,n,): max{ni}+min{n,)~m} and fm(n,,n2,n3)=0 iff 
max(nj) +min{ni} <m. 0 
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Since max{n;} +min{q} >+(n + l), f, is positive on L, when m=+(n+ 1). 
When m=+(n+3), f,=O at (+(n+l), +(n--l),O), (+(n--l),+(n-l),l), and of 
course at permutations of these two. As m increases, the region where f, = 1 
shrinks, and the region where f, = 0 expands. 
This is shown in Fig. 1 for n = 9 and m = 5,6,7,8, where L, is pictured in bary- 
centric coordinates. Each of the three corners has one ni=9 and the other two at 
0; internal points along the sides have exactly one nj =O; in general, the nj CO- 
ordinates of a point in the lattice are the perpendicular distances to the three sides. 
m=8 m=7 
m=6 m=5 
Fig. 1. Lg. 
Lattice points with f, = 1 are shown by the black dots on Fig. 1, and those with 
f, = 0 are identified by the open circles. Undistinguished points have 0 <f, < 1. As 
m increases, the region where 0< f, < 1 breaks into three separated parts (m = 7), 
with only one point in each part when m = n - 1, namely (n - 2,1,1) or a permuta- 
tion. When m =n (not shown on the figure), f, =0 except at the three corners, 
where f, = 1. 
Our next theorem, for differential changes in f, at adjacent lattice points, will 
help to determine which points in L,(m) minimize f,. 
Theorem 2. Suppose a, b and c are nonnegative integers, a I c I b and 
a+b+c+l=n. Then fm(a,b+1,c)2f,(a+1,b,c), and 
f,(a,b+l,c)>f,(a+l,b,c) iff a<b<m and csn-m. 
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Although the proof of Theorem 2 is given in the next section, we note here why 
fj(~, b + 1, c) =fj(a+ l,b, c) when the restrictions at the end of the theorem do not 
hold. First, if a=b, then f,(a,b+ 1,~) =fm(a+ 1, b,c) by symmetry. Second, if 
b~m,thenbothf,valuesarel.Andthird,ifc>n-m,thena+b+l<mand,by 
Theorem 1, both f, values are 0. 
The following corollary of Theorems 1 and 2, which is also proved in the next 
section, partially explains the minimization situation. Here, the later, Z(X) denotes 
the nearest integer to x. 
Theorem 3. Suppose (nF,n&nn:) is a point in L,,(m) that minimizes f, on L,,(m) 
when m I +(n + 3). Then, up to permutations on the components of (nz nc n3*): 
(i) (n;, n;“, n:) = (n - m, n - m, 2m - n) if m r Z(+n); 
(ii) (n~,n,*,nn3*)E{(a,a,n-2a): Z(fn)<a<n-m} if m<Z(+n). 
Part (i) of the theorem completely specifies the minimizing points in L,,(m) when 
m is suitably large - Z(+n) or larger. Part (ii), which is less definite, applies to cases 
in which m lies between +(n + 1) and Z(+n). The theorem is illustrated for n = 23 in 
Fig. 2. The top part of the figure, for m = 18, illustrates (i): the minimizing points 
(see asterisks) are (5,5,13), (5,13,5) and (13,5,5). The bottom part of the figure, 
for m = 13 = +(n + 3), illustrates (ii) when n = 2 (mod 3). In this case the minimizing 
points must be asterisks: at least one of (10,10,3), (9,9,5) and (8,8,7) minimizes 
frs over L2s(13), but Theorem 3 doesn’t say which one(s). 
Although I have not been able to resolve the ambiguity in the final part of 
Theorem 3, there is no difficulty in writing down the f, values for the potential 
minimizing points. Given Ola< b and b>O, let 
B(a, b) = i 
0 
p 2-b, 
,=o I 
the cumulative binomial probability for a or fewer successes in b independent trials 
with success probability + on each trial. Also let B*(a, b) = 1 - B(a - 1, b), the proba- 
bility of a or more successes. The definition off, and the symmetry of the binomial 
distribution yield 
f,(a,a,n-2a) = 2B*(m-a,n-2a)B*(m-a,a)+ [B*(m-n+2a,a)l* 
= 2B(n-m-a,n-2a)B(2a-m,a)+[B(n-m-a,a)]2 
for the feasible values of a in part (ii) of Theorem 3. 
When m = +(n + l), we know [l] that the value of a that minimizes f,(a, a, n - 2a) 
is Z(+n). This is the minimum feasible a value in part (ii) of Theorem 3. It is there- 
fore tempting to suspect that this value will also minimizef, on L,(n) in part (ii). 
However, this is not generally true. 
For example, suppose n = 3k for odd kl3, and take m = +(n + 3). The smallest 
and largest a values in Theorem 3(ii) are k = fn and $(k - 1) = +(n - 3) respectively. 
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(m,n)= (18,23): Thm. 3 ( i ) 
(m,n)=(13,23): Thm.3tii) 
Thus 
Fig. 2. Lz3. 
jJ$+z,$) = 3[B(f(k- 3), k)]2, 
f,($ - 3), +(n - 3), 3) = 2B(O, 3)B@k - 3), $(k- 1)) + [B(O, +(k - l))]! 
For small k> 3 it is easily checked that f,(fn,+n,+n)<f,(+(n - 3),+(n - 3), 3). 
However, as k+m, 
f,(f& in, fn) + :, 
f,(S(n - 3), +(n - 3), 3) + $, 
so that (‘n 1, ‘n) cannot be the minimizing point for large k. 3 93 33 
In fact. since 
f,(3(n - t), i(n - t), t) --f 2B(+(t - 3), t) 
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as n+ 03 when m = +(n + 3), and since 2B(+(t - 3), t) increases towards 1 as t 
increases, it seems likely that fCn+3j,2 will be minimized at (+(n - 3), +(n - 3), 3) in 
part (ii) of Theorem 3 for all large n = 0 (mod 3). 
More generally, the following seems like a reasonable point of departure for 
further investigation of the minimizing situation. 
Conjecture. When (ii) of Theorem 3 obtains, f, will be minimized over L,,(m) at 
either the smallest or largest a value specified there. Moreover, as n increases, and 
either m = +(n •t 3) + c for c L 0 or, alternatively, m/n remains approximately con- 
stant between 3 and f, the minimizer will change from the smallest a value to the 
largest a value and remain at the largest a value thereafter. 
3. Proofs 
To prove Theorem 2, we divide n = a + b + c + 1 into groups of sizes a, 6, c and 
1, the last of which is the ‘pivot’. Let r, s and t be the numbers of rankings by type 
according to the following scheme for the first three groups: 
a: r have 123, a-r have 132; 
b: s have 213, b-s have 231; 
c: t have 312, c-t have 321. 
The pivot determines which of (a + 1, 6, c) and (a, b + 1, c) obtains as (n,, n2, nJ). The 
pivot has 123 or 132, each with probability +, for (a+ l,b, c), and 213 or 231, each 
with probability +, for (a, b + 1, c). 
Because the groups are independent, and any one of 1, 2 and 3 might be 
m-dominant, 
2f,(a+l,b,c) = [P(a+l+trm)P(a+l+s2m) 
+P(b+c-trm)P(b+l+rrm) 
+P(b+c-szm)P(a+c-rzm)] 
+[P(a+l+tzm)P(a+l+sLm) 
+P(b+c-trm)P(b+r>m) 
+P(b+c-szm)P(a+c+l-rzm)], 
2fm(a,b+l,c)=[P(a+t~m)P(a+1+s2m) 
+P(b+c+l-trm)P(b+l+rlm) 
+P(b+c-szm)P(a+c-rzm)] 
+ [P(a+tzm)P(a+sLm) 
+P(b+c+l-tIm)P(b+l+rzm) 
+P(b+c+l-szm)P(a+c-r>m)]. 
Probabilities of dominant candidates 137 
Let F,,,(a,b,c)=2[f,(a,b+ l,c)-f,(a+ l,b,c)], and assume that ascs 6. As indi- 
cated after Theorem 2, FM=0 if bzm or a=b or c>n-m. 
Assume henceforth that a< b<m and cln -m. We complete the proof of 
Theorem 2 by showing that F,(a, b, c) > 0 under these restrictions. When the first 
f, expression in the preceding paragraph is subtracted from the second, cancella- 
tion of identical terms and binomial symmetry yield 
F,(a,b,c)=2[P(t=b+c+l-m)P(rsa+b+l-m) 
-P(t=m-a-l)P(.ssa+b+l-m)] 
+ [P(r=m-b-l)P(tsb+c-m) 
-P(r=a+c+l-m)P(ssb+c-m)] 
+[P(s=b+c+l-m)P(rsa+c-m) 
-P(s=m-a-l)P(tsa+c-m)]. 
Since m =+(n + 1) is covered by [I], we assume henceforth that m>+(n + 1) and 
show that the first difference on the right hand side of the preceding expression is 
positive while the second and third differences are nonnegative. 
For the first difference, 
P(t=b+c+l-m)>P(t=m-a-l) 
since m-a-l>+c, m-a-l>b+c+l-mr0, and b+c+l-m is closer to the 
midpoint SC of the support of t than is m -a - 1. If in fact +cz b + c + 1 -m, then 
m-a-l-~c>~c-(b+c+1-m)iffb~a.Sinceb+c+1-miscloserto~c,ithas 
larger probability by the symmetry and unimodality of the binomial distribution. 
For the other terms in the first difference, 
P(r<a+b+l-m)>P(ssa+b+l-m) 
since a< b (r’s upper support point < s’s upper support point) and a + b + 1 -m < 6. 
It then follows that 
P(t=b+c+l-m)P(r<a+b+l-m) 
>P(t=m-a-l)P(s<a+b+l-m), 
so the first difference in the expression for F,,, is positive. 
For the second difference, P(r = m - b - 1) 2 P(r = a + c + 1 - m) and P(t I 
b + c - m) 2 P(s 5 b + c - m). The latter inequality follows from CI b (upper support 
points). The former follows from m-b-l>a+c+l-m,+a>a+c+l-m, and 
+a-(a+c+l-m>r(m-b-l)-+a, or, equivalently, csb. 
For the third difference, P(rsa+ c- m) rP(ts a+ c- m) since asc (upper 
support points), and P(s=b+c+l-m)rP(s=m-a-1) since m-a-lr+b, 
m-a-1>b+c+1-m~Oand(m-a-1)-~dr~b-(b+c+1-m),i.e.a~c.Thus 
both the second and third differences are nonnegative, and therefore F,(a, b, c) > 0. 
This completes the proof of Theorem 2. The proof of Theorem 3 is based directly 
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on Theorems 1 and 2, and is most easily visualized with the aid of triangular lattice 
diagrams as in Figs. 1 and 2. 
For given m 2 $(n + 3), the points in L, withf, = 1 are three equivalent triangular 
sublattices with one corner of each at a corner point of L,. The points in L, with 
f, = 0, shown by the open circles in Figs. 1 and 2, consist of the border points that 
do not havef, = 1 plus the triangular sublattices towards the center of L, that have 
the f, = 0 points along one border as a base or edge. The three f, = 0 triangular 
sublattices may be disjoint (Fig. 2, bottom) or they may overlap (Figs. 1 and 2, top). 
The extreme case of m = n, which fits into Theorem 3(i), has f, = 1 at the corners 
of L, and f, = 0 elsewhere. We assume hence forth that +(n + 3) i m I n - 1, and 
consider the three parities of n (mod 3). 
(0,o.n) 
a C 
n=O (MOD3) 
n=l (MOD 3) 
n=2 (MOD 3) 
Fig. 3 
Suppose first that n = 0 (mod 3), say n = 3k. The lower part of L, for this case is 
shown at the top of Fig. 3, with central point (k, k, k). The solid lines in the figure 
are lattice lines as in the previous figures; the dashed lines are the perpendicular 
bisectors of each border of L, from its opposite corner. 
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The arrows on the lattice lines indicate the directions in which f, decreases or 
does not increase according to Theorems 1 and 2. If two adjacent points on such 
a line are both in an f, = 1 region or in an f, = 0 region, then of course no change 
occurs in f, between the two points. Otherwise there is a decrease in f, according 
to Theorem 2. Of special note are points like x and y between (k, k, k) and a corner, 
where x is on the perpendicular bisector and y is adjacent to x but closer to (k, k, k). 
If at least one of x and y does not have f, E {0, l}, then the a = c subcase of 
Theorem 2 implies that fm(x)>fm(y). A similar result does not generally hold on 
the other part of the perpendicular, e.g. between z and a point adjacent to z but 
closer to (k, k, k) since this would require the > conclusion of Theorem 2 to hold 
when c= b+ 1, which is in fact true when m =+(n + 1) but not otherwise. 
Continuing with n = 0 (mod 3), suppose first that (k, k, k) is in the 0 region, i.e. 
f,(k, k, k) = 0, which is true iff 2k< m by Theorem 1. In this case the arrows in the 
quadrilateral region [(O,O, n), A, (k, k, k), B] show that the point in that region which 
minimizes f, > 0 is the point on the perpendicular that is closest to (k, k, k) and has 
f,>O. This is the point (a,a,n-2~) for which maxIn;> +min{ni} =(n-2a)+a=m, 
or a = n - m. Since every point in the triangular region [B, (k, k, k), C] has f, = 0, it 
follows that (n:, $, n:) = (n -m, n -m, 2m -n), as in Theorem 3(i). 
Suppose next for n = 0 (mod 3), that f,(k, k, k) > 0, which is true precisely when 
2kzm. Then every point in [(O,O,n),A, (k, k, k),B] other than (k, k, k) has an f, 
value larger than that at (k, k, k). The only other points that can challenge (k, k, k) 
for the minimum f,>O are those along the perpendicular between (k, k, k) and the 
borders, such as z. If 2k = m, or fn = m, then there are no such points with f, > 0, so 
(nr, n;, n:) = (k, k, k) as recorded in part (i) of Theorem 3. The remaining cases, for 
which 2k> m, are covered by part (ii). The points in {(a, a, n - 2~): +n 5 a< n -m} 
and their permutations are precisely (k, k, k) and the points on the short segments 
of the perpendiculars out from (k, k, k) that have f, > 0. 
Slight modifications in the preceding analysis are needed for the other parities 
since these cases have three (rather than one) central points. 
The middle diagram in Fig. 3 shows the central part of L, for n = 1 (mod 3). If 
the three middle points have f, = 0 (iff 2k + 1 <m when n = 3k + l), then f, > 0 is 
minimized by the point on the x-perpendicular closest to (k, k, k + 1) that has positive 
f, value. This point is (a,a,n-2a) with a+(n-2a)=m, or a=n-m, as in 
Theorem 3(i). On the other hand, if f,(k, k, k-t l)>O (iff 2k+ 1 zm), then the 
potential minimizers are the three central points along with the points on the per- 
pendiculars towards the borders, such as z, that have f, >O. If 2k+ 1 = m, or 
m =$(2n + l), no such z have f,(z)>O, so that f, is minimized over L,(m) at 
(k, k, k+ 1) and its permutations. This is included in part (i) of the theorem. The 
other cases, for 2k+ 1 >m, are covered by part (ii). 
Finally, the bottom diagram in Fig. 3 describes the central part of L, when n = 2 
(mod 3). If the central points have f, =0 (iff 2k+ 1 <m when n = 3k+ 2), then 
f,>O is minimized at the points on the perpendiculars from the corners that have 
f,>O and are closest to the center. If 2k-t 1 = m, or m = f(2n - l), then all points 
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like z have &(z) = 0 and the three central points minimize f, >0: in this case, 
f,(k, k, k+ 2) >f,(k, k + 1, k+ 1) with a = c in Theorem 2. The preceding cases are 
covered by Theorem 3(i). If m < 2k + 1, we obtain the situation described in part (ii) 
where points like z must be considered. 
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